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ABSTRACT

Educational policy and administration is an applied human science that is a field of both study and practice. As such, it needs a theoretical framework--a theory of practice--for the understanding and informing of administrative practice. A theory of practice would be integrative; would focus on increasing understanding and improving practice, on action toward goals, and on aspects unique to educational policy and administration; and would be concerned with what "is," what "ought" to be, and what these mean. A theory of practice must include meaning, because educational policy and administration is a cultural activity and cultural activities are understood only by knowing their meaning. Meaning is arrived at through hermeneutics, the art of interpretation. An example concerning a hypothetical conflict-management situation shows how hermeneutics helps to find meanings. A theory-of-practice approach would include four viewpoints generated by combining two perspectives (practical and theoretical) with two types of knowledge (descriptive and normative). Hermeneutical inquiry would involve not only answering questions about the hypothetical conflict from each of the four viewpoints but also examining the relationships among the viewpoints' questions and answers. As hermeneutical inquiry was repeated, understanding of the conflict would increase. (RW)

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THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EDUCATION POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: AN HERMENEUTICS PERSPECTIVE

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(Abridged Version)

THEORY OF PRACTICE IN EDUCATION POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: AN HERMENEUTICS PERSPECTIVE

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This paper discusses the concept of theory of practice and the possible contribution of hermeneutics to its development and implementation. Hermeneutics is the art of interpretation. It seeks to go beyond the objective identification of facts as "is" to understanding the facts given certain combinations of circumstances and, to interpreting the facts in an attempt to render them meaningful. The paper begins with an analysis of educational policy and administration as a field of study and a field of practice in an effort to show why the theory of practice concept seems so suitable. Hermeneutics is then examined as a mode of inquiry and analysis within a theory of practice.

Educational policy and administration is a distinct enterprise.[1] Two important characteristics of its distinctiveness are its applied nature and its human activity. Being both an applied science and a human science places certain unique requirements on inquiry in the field and on the development of prescriptions for practice. Applied fields typically rely on a fairly developed knowledge base and are linked to one or more academic disciplines. In the case of educational policy and administration, the political, economic, social and management sciences have traditionally stood out as key disciplines. Applied suggests that knowledge from these disciplines is utilized toward some end. Further, in pursuit of this end action

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takes place; decisions are made and implemented. Thus applied fields can be described as having teleological and praxis qualities; as being concerned with practice toward some end.

Added to this applied nature is the characteristic of human activity. Unlike the study of natural phenomena, as might be the case in chemistry or physics, the human sciences are distinctly more artificial. As Herbert A. Simon suggests, "A natural science is a body of knowledge about some class of things - objects or phenomena - in the world: about the characteristics and properties that they have; about how they behave and interact with each other" (Simon). The sciences of the artificial, on the other hand, are created by human conventions. The natural sciences are more concerned with how things are; the sciences of the artificial with how things ought to be and with designs which help to attain goals. "The thesis is that certain phenomena are 'artificial' in a very special sense: they are as they are only because of a system's being molded, by goals or purposes, to the environment in which it lives. . . Artificial phenomena have an air of 'contingency' in their malleability by environment" (Simon p. ix). It is this malleability, this air of contingency which is determined by persons according to their perceptions of reality, and according to their known and unknown goals or purposes that raises for Simon this interesting question about the sciences of the artificial: "The genuine problem is to show how empirical propositions can be made at all about the systems that, given different circumstances, might be quite other than they are" (Simon p. x).

As a human science educational policy and administration is not merely concerned with ends in an instrumental sense but with better ends. Educational policy for example speaks to what ought to be and directs its

analysis to uncovering and understanding the conditions under which this "ought" is to be realized. Educational administration on the other hand is the science and art of developing and implementing effective and satisfying ways to achieve desired ends. Improving the social order gives educational policy and administration a normative quality which must of neccessity become an important part of inquiry, analysis and practice. In short, educational policy and administration is a science of designing courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred once (Simon, p. 55).

Traditional conceptions of theory and practice have not been able to fully capture the complexity and sensitivity needed to accommodate to the teleological, praxis and artificial qualities of educational policy and administration. Needed nevertheless, is some theoretical framework, some systematic mode of analysis, some series of cognitive maps which can help in understanding and informing administrative practice. Recognizing the complexity of the problem and the shortcomings of traditional conceptions of theoretical science is not to eschew theory. Needed is a theory which can accommodate itself to practice. Such a theory would not seek truth in an effort to expand the knowledge base in a particular discipline but would seek informed practice. The concept of theory of practice represents a promising attempt to develop a series of theoretical formulations better able to accommodate themselves to the teleological, praxis and artificial characteristics of educational policy and administration.

Though I speak of theory of practice I have in mind the development of a number of theories of practice; each different in scope, the dimensions from which they are comprised and the sorts of problems they are able to illuminate. They would share, nevertheless, certain common char-

acteristics and rest on similar epistemological assumptions. The following are suggested as some of the more critical characteristics and assumptions which should characterize a theory of practice.

1. A theory of practice would be integrative. It would recognize the value and utility of both normative and descriptive science, positivism and moral science, explanation and understanding, causal inquiry and interpretation. Its strength and future would depend on linking these seemingly separate features together, as both alternate and integrative ways of knowing. Debate of one point of view versus another (for example the pitting of rational positivism against phenomonalogy, critical theory, or hermeneutics) would be viewed as regressive. Though intellectually satisfying to the academics involved such debates seem actually to impede the development of a theory of practice.

2. A theory of practice would emphasize increasing understanding and improving practice. Such a theory would recognize and appreciate the ultimate goal of truth critical to traditional science but would accept as well, that in practice, truth is ultimately culturally and perceptually determined. A true knowledge of what is and a true rendering of causal relationships as defined by traditional theoretical science is but one dimension in the complex interaction of factors which should be considered. The ultimate goal of seeking truth as defined by traditional theoretical science is therefore, replaced by the goal of increasing understanding, informing intuition and improving practice. The pursuit of understanding as a mode of inquiry requires that practical reasoning gain prominence. Practical reasoning differs

from that of proof reasoning which is characteristic of traditional theoretical science. "Practical syllogism provides the sciences of man with something long missing from their methodology: an explanation model in its own right which is a definite alternative. . . . what the subsumption-theoretic model is to casual explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleological explanation and explanation in history and the social sciences" (Von Wright, p. 27). Traditional theoretical science seeks verification of fact beyond differences in interpretation. In the human scences, however, it is necessary "that one have the sensibility and understanding necessary to be able to make and comprehend the readings [y which we can explain the reality concerned" (Taylor, p. 39). Theories of practice are cast from an understanding, not verification science. This is not to discount the importance of establishing what is, of accurately rendering the descriptive facts of the world. One must have some basis for understanding. The facts, however, are not ends in themselves, but the shadow and substance of interpretations which increase understanding. Understanding, in turn, is a prerequisite to improved practice.

3. A theory of practice would emphasize action towards some goal or series of goals. This action emphasis requires that bounded rationality replace absolute rationality, that subjectivity and intersubjectivity be accepted as legitimate units of analyses, and that accommodations be sought in recognition that the world of policy and administration is dynamic. Decisions are made continuously, events are forever unfolding, and with each event

completed comes changes in events anticipated. A theory of practice must work in process. The still camera and snapshot metaphors associated with traditional scientific inquiry need to be replaced by the motion camera metaphor.

4. A theory of practice would focus on aspects unique to education policy and administration. Attention would be given to policy qua policy science, administration qua administrative science, politics qua political science and so on for these are important dimensions in support of a theory of practice. Prime attention, however, would be given to the particulars which make educational policy and administration unique. "Theories within disciplines we would presume, are more limited in scope than theories of practice and the purposes are those more related to the building of knowledge in discipline rather than illuminating practice in a field like educational administration" (Culbertson, p. 2). A theory which seeks understanding does not shy away from drawing practical conclusion from its discoveries and from turning its theoretical analyses into social practice (Bauman, p. 59). Essential to a theory of practice is an attention, understanding, and sensitivity to the particular. "A historian or sociologist of religion must himself have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying and understand the considerations which govern the lives of its participants. A historian of art must have some aesthetic sense if he is to understand the problems confronting the artist of his period; and without this he will have left out of his account precisely what would have made it a history of art, as opposed

to a rather puzzling external amount of certain motions which certain people have been perceived to go through" (Winch, p. 88). So it is in our field, a theory of practice in educational policy and administration requires that theorists and practitioners develop a sense of educational connoisseurship (Eisner) if their craft is to be understood in its fullest context. Thus a practical orientation to inquiry in educational policy and administration would require emphasizing the particular action--"particular decision that had efficicaious effects, rather than the decision process; specific organizational changes that had desired result. . . . Whereas academic inquiry aims for elegantly parsimunious abstractions, practice--oriented professional knowledge is comprised of masses of details about what to do and how to do it to achieve desired outcomes" (Silver).

5. A theory of practice would be concerned with what "is." Of interest are accurate and reliable descriptions of the real world and how it works. With respect to administrative and organizational behavior for example, relationships would be explained, linked together and predicted. Laws and rules which govern behavior would be sought. Thus traditional scientific inquiry plays an important role in developing a theory of practice. Such scientific inquiry can be viewed broadly as having two main aspects; the ascertaining and discovery of facts and the construction of hypotheses (von Wright, p. 1). The first aspect can be referred to as descriptive and the second as theoretical. Theoretical science, in turn, can be viewed as serving two main purposes, predicting on the one hand and explaining on the

other. What are the likely events and outcomes of certain actions and experiments and what new facts can be anticipated suggests the first purpose. Explaining or making sense of facts which are observed or which occur suggests the second purpose. No progress can be made in developing a theory of practice if the themes of prediction and explanation, the hallmarks of traditional scientific inquiry, are not included. In a theory of practice however, the ledger is incomplete without the normative side of science or the "ought" side.

6. A theory of practice would be concerned with what "ought" to be. What cultural imperatives should determine action? What values should be expressed? What qualities of life should be in evidence? What standards should be applied? Theories of practice are designed to improve things, to bring about higher standards, to strive for a better life. Much debate exists about the role of normative assertions in any scientific endeavor. Skeptics point to the difficulty in establishing the truth of such assertions. Part of this difficulty is in the insistence that the same definitions of truth as used in traditional theoretical science be used for normative assertions. Paul Taylor points out, however, that the truth of normative assertions differ from the truth of factual assertions. "The truth of normative assertions depends on human decisions; the truth of factual assertions does not. A factual assertion is true if it corresponds to the way the world is regardless of whether we want the world to be that way....A normative assertion is true, on the other hand, only because we have decided to adopt a standard or rule as applic-

able to what we are making the assertion about. Unless we make such a decision our assertion has no truth or falsity. And the way the world is does not logically determine what decision we must make. Our adoption of a standard or rule on which the true or falsity of our assertion depends does not itself depend on the way things are. We must decide what ought to be the case. We cannot discover what ought to be the case by investigating what is the case" (Paul W. Taylor, p. 248).

Normative assertions provide us with murky waters to be sure, but the telological and praxis characteristics of educational policy and administration require that we traverse them nonetheless. Normative issues are inescapable in any human enterprise characterized by action toward some intents. Being concerned with the descriptive and normative are essential, but the ledger of inquiry and professional practice still remains incomplete without the interpretive side of science or the meaning side.

7. A theory of practice would be concerned with what is and ought "mean". Educational policy and administration has already been described as a field of inquiry and practice characterized by intentions, actions, and human activity. Simon's concept of artificial science has been used as an appropriate designation for this field. Educational organizations and the environments within which they exist, for example, can be viewed as social systems. They share with other social systems three interdependent components: a theory, a structure, and a technology (Schön). Theory refers to the rules, beliefs, and standards which help define and understand reality within the social system; struc-

ture, to the set of roles and relationships which exist among system members; and technology, the actual procedures and practices by which things get done. With respect to the school as an organization, the interdependent components might be thought of as educational and management platforms which govern behavior, social structures which determine member relationships, and the educational and management activities of members. In investigating and understanding this social system one needs to view the interaction among social system components at two levels; the actions and activities which are observed and the multiple meanings which exist. Important to this inquiry is understanding that the same act has different meanings to different people, and has different meanings when used in conjunction with one event than with another. If a theory of practice is concerned with usable knowledge, then it should be concerned as well with knowledge which makes sense to people. It is for this reason that a theory of practice should move beyond the mapping of reality in abstract to the mapping of reality as viewed in different contexts and as viewed by different actors. Such metaphorical analogies as photo replica, electronic portrait, and play script tend to characterize descriptive modes of inquiry. The photo collage, impressionistic painting, and play performance suggest the worlds of interpretation and meaning. No human event studied in abstract is the same as in use.

Meaning is an essential ingredient in a theory of practice. Understanding is key to the pursuit of meaning and understanding comes from interpreting the shadow in substance of observed events. Human organi-

zations and enterprises are cultural artifacts which require that inquiry into these fields move beyond description and explanation. "One needs to explain nature, but to understand culture;...to 'cognitively assimilate' natural phenomena one has to arrange them in causal chains, but to know cultural phenomena one has to grasp their meaning" (Bauman, pg. 89). At first glance empathy might be viewed as the key to understanding human action and unlocking its meaning. If this is the case, then one need only put him or herself in the place of another. Understanding, however, "is not in act of empathy, but an act of analysis" (Bauman, p. 180). As Schutz argues:

> "Meaning is not a quality of certain lived experiences [Erlebnise] emerging distinctively in the stream of consciousness....It is rather the result of my explication of past lived experiences which are grasped reflectively from an actual now and from an actually valid reference scheme. . . . Lived experiences first become meaningful, then, when they are explicated post hoc and become comprehensible to me as well-circumscribed experiences. (Shutz, as quoted in Bauman p. 180)

Meaning therefore is "constituted in retrospect, in the course of subsequent analysis," (Bauman pg. 180). Meaning is construed and inferred from events occuring and occured "it is the end product of a long and laborious gathering together of hints and clues scattered all over the wide range of cultural phenomena, and synthesizing from this disparate evidence a totality" (Bauman, p. 92).

The art of interpretation is thus important to analysis in a theory of practice. Interpretation is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object, issue or event being studied (Taylor, p. 1). Objects, issues and events studied as "is" yield "brute" data, brute inferences and brute descriptions (Taylor, p. 5). Brute data is removed from its context and studied antiseptically. Brute data is essential to establishing the social facts of a given issue, situation or event. By contrast, "sense" data

seeks to uncover the meaning of brute data to different individuals and given different intents and contexts (Taylor, p. 11). Touching the brow to brush a fly or to bid at an auction are examples of identical acts with different meanings given different intents. The famed Italian pinch in a Roman plaza might be viewed differently by a woman than the same pinch in the darkened foyer of a theater in Urbana, Illinois. Competitive behavior of children might be applauded by parents of one subculture living on the 400 block of Urban City but frowned upon by parents of another subculture just a block away. Recording the number of brow touchings observed, the frequency pattern of pinching and the incidence of competitive behavior are social facts which tell us very little of the social meanings and social consequences these acts have for the principals involved. Similar analogies come to mind in reference to emphasizing social facts without sufficient thought to meanings in the supervision and evaluation of teaching; a topic to be considered later in this paper. Brute data is yielded by careful observation. Sense data is yielded by careful interpretation. The teleological, praxis and human characteristics of educational policy and administration require that inquiry and analysis go beyond brute to sense data.

In sum, a science of interpretation seeks, a) to make sense of an object, situation or event, b) distinguishes between the object, situation or event as fact from its meaning, and c) has in mind a particular reference group or circumstance in establishing sense. "Meaning in this sense --let us call it experential meaning--thus is for a subject, of some thing, in a field" (Taylor, p. 9).

Of interest to educational policy and administration is the interplay of three questions: what "is" fact and reality; what "ought" to be; and what

do events which comprise the is and ought "mean"? Normative, descriptive and interpretive science as reflected in the three questions, once integrated, become the basis and structure of a theory of practice. Hermeneutics can help in this integration by providing a cognitive map and a mode of inquiry and analysis by which the normative, descriptive and interpretive sciences can come to play in addressing practical problems of educational policy and administration.

Hermeneutics in the social sciences is the art of interpretation. It is the theory of the operation of understanding in its relation to the interpretation of certain events and issues in context. Its history as a discipline is long and dates back to scholarly debates over the authenticity and true meaning of classical texts of Grecio-Latin antiquity and of sacred texts such as the Old and New Testaments. From this technical origin hermeneutics evolved into a mode of philosophical inquiry addressed to epistomology in seeking an answer to the question "How do we know?" (Ricoeur, p. 120). Of late, hermeneutics has taken on an ontological quality as it adds to its quest "What is the mode of that being who only exists through understanding"? (Ricoeur, p. 120). It is this shift from a philosophy of science per se to a more action-oriented perspective concerned with actual meaning in a given context which makes hermeneutics attractive to an applied field such as educational policy and administration.

Hermeneutics seeks as its goal ever clearer interpretations. As an epistomology it is a mode of knowledge which seeks perfection in understanding but never finds it. Hermeneutics is likely to be more successful where praxis is not a characteristic of the objects of study. Historical events, for example, lend themselves to hermeneutical inquiry because they remain done, fixed in time. Post hoc analysis of events reveals new

insights and illuminates more vividly the meaning of these events, but the events themselves as facts of occurrence do not change. Contrast history with the fastpaced, ever-evolving and dynamic nature of educational policy and administration. In this field we are concerned with events occurred, presently occurring, and likely to occur. The necessity for understanding and meaning in studying these events remains important but is tempered by the bounded rationality of time unfolding and the necessity for action.

The famous hermeneutical circle, for example, refers to the endless analysis of object within objects, event within events, and item within context seeking ever-enriched meanings.

> The circle can also be put in terms of part-whole relations: we are trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings of its partial expressions; and yet, because we are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole (Taylor, p. 4).

> Understanding means going in circles: rather than a unilinear progress toward better and less vulnerable knowledge, it consists of an endless recapitulation and reassessment of collective memories--evermore voluminous, but always selective. It is difficult to see how any of the successive recapitulations can claim to be final and conclusive; still more difficult would be to substantiate this claim (Bauman, p. 17).

Each revolution within the hermeneutical circle stirs the analyst on to further analysis in a seemingly never-ending search for more lucid, intense and complete meanings. "One would rather speak of a hermeneutic spiral, to be sure: in our search of the lost affinity, in our urge to re-appropriate fully estranged creations of the kindred Spirit, we never really finish our job. But we move from the particular to the universal and back in ever-widening circles, ever closer to the ideal of the Spirit once again, but this time self-consciously, unified" (Bauman, p. 28).

Educational policy and administration, by contrast, does not seek ever-clearer meanings and understandings as an end. Its purpose is to inform and improve practice. It seeks a qualitative difference in the social order by altering present circumstances for the better. The praxis qualities of educational policy and administration therefore, make it difficult to become an hermeneutical science in its own right. Yet, its teleological and human characteristics lend themselves to hermeneutical inquiry and analysis. Can educational policy and administration become an hermeneutical science? The answer is probably not, but hermeneutical inquiry and analysis can play an important role in developing a theory of practice in educational policy and administration.

In the remaining sections of this paper I propose some theory of practice models addressed to problems of educational policy and administration and show how hermeneutical thinking can help in analysis of these problems.[2] In this context understanding and meaning are not ends in themselves but roadways to more informed intuition and improved practice. One might characterize my analyses, therefore, as more akin to hermeneutical thinking rather than hermeneutical science and of using hermeneutical cycles rather than the seemingly endless hermeneutical circle or spiral.

Of interest to analysis in educational policy and administration are events occurred, events occurring and events to occur. Of course, what has happened, what is happening, and what should happen are only conceptual distinctions which typically lose separate identities in practice. Their separate use here is therefore a semantic convenience. Conflict management and the supervision and evaluation of teaching will be used as problem contexts to illustrate a theory of practice suitable to analyzing

events occurred and events occurring. The problem of centralization-decentralization in a high school will be used to suggest a mode suitable to deciding what one should do.

Two key distinctions have been made in this paper: descriptive knowledge or knowledge of what "is" as being different than normative knowledge or knowledge of what "ought" to be; and, viewing the world from a theoretical perspective as opposed to a practical perspective. The integrative criterion suggested for a theory of practice requires that each of these dimensions not only come to play as important separate aspects of analysis, but that they be integrated into a unified analysis. We can, therefore, speak of descriptive knowledge and normative knowledge on the one hand and viewing events from a practical perspective and theoretical perspective on the other.

Four combinations are suggested by this interplay. practical-descriptive, theoretical-descriptive, practical-normative and theoretical-normative. The four can be displayed in grid form as illustrated in Figure 1. Within this grid, quadrant 1 (practical-descriptive) focuses attention on the concrete facts which exist in a situation; quadrant 2 (theoretical-descriptive) focuses attention on the scientific laws and relationships which help explain these facts and other facts of this genre; quadrant 3 (practical-normative) focuses attention on the stated and implied intents and platforms of individual actors; and, quadrant 4 (theoretical-normative) focuses attention on the stated and applied cultural norms, ideals and standards which bear on the situation under analysis. Each of the four quadrants represents sources for establishing certain social facts which describe and explain the situation of issue. As hermeneutical inquiry, represented by the "spiral-cycle" in the center of Figure 1, proceeds the social facts

Descriptive Knowledge

what "is"

1. Practical-Descriptive	2. Theoretical-Descriptive
What concrete facts exist in this situation? How can these facts be described in an effort to develop a portrait of social fact reality?	How can observed facts and other facts of this genre be casually related and explained? What scientific laws and theoretical framework exist which help record, explain and predict social facts of issue?
What are the stated and implied goals and intents of the actors as individuals and as collectivities?	What values, ideals and cultural imperatives exist which govern behavior on the one hand and which set the standard for behavior on the other?
3. Practical-Normative	4. Theoretical-Normative



Practical Perspective

Theoretical Perspective

Normative Knowledge

what "ought" to be

Suggested Avenues of Inquiry in a Theory of Practice

Figure 1

become closer to social meanings. Until this progression from social fact to social meaning begins, true understanding is suspect and presumably the intuitions of analyst and administrator are not adequately informed.

Consider, for example, a situation in a school or college where certain departments or units are involved in serious conflict with each other. In examining the avenues of inquiry suggested in Figure 1, certain key questions might be asked:

Quad 1. What is the nature of conflict which exists in this school? How can this conflict be objectively and accurately described? Who are the principals involved in this conflict? What do they do and say?

Quad 2. What cognitive maps, models, and theoretical frameworks exist which help explain and tie together observed events? Can causal links among events be theoretically established? What research exists which substantiates these theoretical speculations? Can future actions be predicted?

Quad 3. What are the hopes, aspirations and intents of the individual actors involved in the conflict? What do they seek? What do they want to happen? What are they trying to accomplish? Can these intents be separated into those espoused and those inferred from actions, attitudes and language systems used?

Quad 4. What norms, values and standards exist which help to develop a set of ideal criteria to which groups involved in the crisis might strive? What cultural imperatives exist in this situation which govern behavior of individuals involved? How do such considerations as justice, equity,

free expression and democratic ideals come to play? Are there images of how schools should be organized and how groups should behave which in the ideal are most suited to quality schooling?

From Q1 observations we might observe that individuals within each of the competing groups are becoming more closely knit and disciplined and that demands for loyalty are increasing. We might also learn that some individuals involved have no interest in the conflict per se but are responding to increases in pressure to express loyalty to the group. From a Q2 review of traditional social science literature (i.e.; Sherif, et al., Blake and Mouten) on the topic we might note that as intergroup conflict increases intragroup conflict decreases. Members begin to overlook individual differences and emphasize commonalities. Further, the group becomes more structured and the leader more powerful as group members become more willing to accept autocratic leadership. And finally, the group works harder and is willing to sacrifice personal interests on behalf of group goals. All of these factors are thought to contribute to intragroup effectiveness but seem also to have negative consequences for intergroup effectiveness. Thus, while individual departments may seem to be more productive and display higher morale, the college or school as a whole may actually be less effective.

This sort of analysis can be very useful in developing a framework for understanding some of the forces which might be at play in this particular conflict situation. But the analysis suffers from objectivity, abstractness and universalism. Theories of practice are concerned with the particulars of given situations and specific problems. Key to providing an analysis which would be helpful in actually managing conflict in a specific

situation is understanding which comes from the particular. Q3, can help in this effort to understand by charting what it is that motivates individual actors actually involved in the conflict. We are not concerned with individual behavior in the abstract but individual behavior as defined by a particular context. We might learn, for example, that this particular school faces serious problems not at stake in the conflict under study (deteriorating work conditions and prospects of low salary increases, for example) and that the school principal intends to use the present conflict as a means to distract faculty from other issues. Or perhaps the majority of those involved are not interested in the substance of the conflict but are caught up in the psychological effects or are responding to group pressures in a desire to belong. Whatever the case may be, as these facts of the situation change, they cast the more theoretical and descriptive facts yielded by Quadrants 1 and 2 in different lights (in other words their meanings and relevance change). From Q4 comes certain ideal images of how a school might fully function in quest of excellence (i.e.; Likert, Sergiovanni and Carver) and certain ethical criteria (democratic ideals, justice, cooperation, etc.) which become standards for evaluating behavior or for determining what is good and what isn't.

Now that the territory of analysis has been briefly sketched, each of the quadrants would be examined in connection with others. Quad 1, for example, would be compared with Quad 2 in an effort to develop keener descriptions of reality and more powerful causal explanations of events and activities. Actor intents (Quad 3) would be compared with observations of actual behavior (Quad 1) in an effort to determine discrepancies between "espoused theories" and "theories in use" (Arygris and Schön). Both theories would be held up against ideal images and standards which emerge

from Quad 4. This "cycle" of analysis would be repeated and with each repeat, understanding would increase.

Ultimately, the pace of the analysis would shift from examining quads as separate entities to overlapping; from quads being viewed as four independent but related snapshots to one multiple exposure. And gradually, the social facts which comprise each of the four quadrants would become social meanings with relevance to the particular problem at hand. As this progress from social facts to social meanings occurs, the intuitions of both analyst and practitioner become more informed and presumably more reasoned and relevant action is made possible.

> Hermenutics, as a science of interpretation, cannot substitute for a theory of practice anymore than can descriptive or normative science. These sciences exist not as ends in themselves but to serve the decision process in the practice of educational policy and administration. In sum, deciding what to "do" is the sine qua non of a theory of practice. Yet informed doing requires that one consider what is (descriptive science), what ought to be (normative science) and what events mean (interpretative or hermeneutical science).

pp 21 to 41 deleted. pp 21 to 30 provide a trailer evaluation example. pp. 31 to 41 provide a rationale — 23

Notes

1. Though useful conceptual distinctions can be made between policy and administration, in reality the two are inseparable. Freidrich, for example notes: "Public policy, to put it flatly, it a continuous process, the formation of which is inseparable from its execution. Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is being executed as it is being formed. Politics and administration play a continuous role, in both formation and execution, though there is probably more politics in the formulation of policy, more administration in the execution of it." [C. J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in Public Policy, C. J. Friedrich and E. S. Mason, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 6-7]. And Simon notes: "Recognition of this distinction in the meanings of 'correctness' would lend clarity to the distinction that is commonly made in the literature of political science between 'policy questions' and 'administrative questions.' These latter terms were given currency by Goodrow's classic treatise, Politics and Administration, published in 1900. Yet, neither in Goodrow's study nor in any of the innumerable discussions that follow it have any clear-cut criteria or marks of identification been suggested that would enable one to recognize a 'policy question' on sight, or to distinguish it from an 'administrative question.'" [H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950.), pp. 53-54.] The Goodrow reference as cited in Simon is: F. J. Goodrow. Politics and Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1900). Luther

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Galick's 1933 comments echo these sentiments; "what we have in administration is a continual process of decision-action-decision-action. It follows from this that governmental institutions cannot be devised to coincide definitely with any scheme of clean-cut division between policy and administration. Luther Galick, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 169 (Sept. 1933): 61. My colleague John Corbally makes a useful distinction between policy "in the making" and policy "in the interpreting". He suggests that made policy is interpreted in application and ~~some~~ IN THIS SENSE actual policy is created in the interpretive aspects of administrative practice, (informal seminar, Office for Analysis of State Educational Systems, University of Illinois, Urbana, Dec. 1980).

2. Hermeneutics is NOT proposed as an analytical tool compatible with any epistomology. It is, instead, a philosophical mode of inquiry in its own right which contributes a unique and enriched perspective on how we know. Its instrumental features are, therefore, less important than the cognitive map it can provide to heighten sensitivity and awareness in the minds of theoreticians, analysts and practitioners. 24A

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